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Borders of Class 
 
 
In many recent debates on the political theory of immigration, conflicts between 
immigrants and citizens of host societies are explored along identity lines. In this 
paper, I defend the relevance of social class. I focus on two types of conflict, 
distributive and cultural, and show how class boundaries play a crucial role in each. In 
contrast to both defenders and critics of freedom of movement, I argue that borders 
have always been (and will continue to be) open for some and closed for others. The 
same applies to barriers on integration and civic participation. It is time to return to the 
connection between immigration and social class and to start carving political solutions 
that begin with the recognition of class injustice as a fundamental democratic concern.  
 
 
Keywords: migration, justice, capitalism, citizenship, social class 
 
1. Introduction  
“It’s all about immigration. It’s not about trade or Europe or anything like that … The 
movement of people in Europe – fair enough. But not from Africa, Syria, Iraq, 
everywhere else, it’s all wrong”.1 This is how one voter explained, on Channel Four 
news, why he voted for Britain to leave the European Union. He, like many of his fellow 
nationals, believed that immigration pressure had brought the country to reach a 
breaking point. “Breaking point” was also the slogan in one of the most controversial 
posters of the referendum campaign that Nigel Farage led on behalf of the UK 
Independence Party. The pictured showed Farage pointing the finger at a queue of 
refugees crossing the Slovenia-Croatia border in 2015 and read: “The EU has failed 
us all. Let’s break free of the EU and take our country back”.2 
While much more critical of the exaggerations and simplifications voiced by such anti-
immigration sentiment on mainstream media, the issue of how to come to a fair 
settlement of the claims of immigrants, those of citizens in sending societies and those 
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of citizens in receiving societies has been at the centre of many recent debates on 
justice in migration. ”The immigration regimes of most contemporary liberal 
democracies”, argues a prominent recent book, are under ‘extreme stress’.3 Such 
stress, so the account goes, is driven by a number of factors: firstly, the sheer number 
of migrants struggling to be admitted, secondly the premium that (because of a range 
of liberal democratic commitments to equality for all) is placed on “getting one foot 
inside a territory”, and thirdly by “the anxieties, resentments and prejudices of many 
native citizens toward many immigrants”.4 
Advocates of freedom of movement tend to respond to these arguments by 
questioning the very normative premises on which they are grounded. But they do so 
from a perspective that many have found lacking political bite. They suggest that, 
whatever we think about political reality, freedom of movement is a human right, border 
controls are arbitrary and coercive, and the distribution of privileges between rich and 
poor areas of the world is unfair given the basic moral equality between human 
beings.5 
Rather than siding with either critics or advocates of freedom of movement, here I want 
to focus on one dimension of migration debates that both parties seem to neglect. We 
might grant that immigration is a real concern for citizens of liberal states but we need 
to know which citizens are being affected, by what measures, and how they can be 
empowered again. We might agree that open borders are questionable but we need 
to see whether decisions on who to admit and who to exclude affect all migrants in the 
same way. My argument in what follows is that both defenders and critics of freedom 
of movement are wrong to assume that migration poses a problem of justice per se. 
My suggestion is that whether or not it does, and to what extent, depends on who you 
are. Borders have always been (and will continue to be) open for some and closed for 
others. The same applies to barriers on integration and civic participation. If we focus 
on the abstract value of freedom of movement, and its implications for border control, 
we are focusing on a secondary question that is unlikely to matter from the point of 
view of the politics of migration. It is time to return our focus to the connection between 
migration and social class. And it is time to start carving political solutions that begin 
with the recognition of class injustice as a fundamental democratic concern. 
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2. Distributive conflicts 
In defending the centrality of social class to debates about migration, I will focus on 
two worries that are often emphasised when migration related conflicts are discussed, 
one distributive, and the other cultural. As far as the distributive worry is concerned, 
immigrants, it is often argued, compete with natives for jobs, housing, access to 
healthcare, schooling etc. Given the commitment of liberal states to guaranteeing 
access to a certain level of welfare to whoever resides in their territory, it is natural that 
the latter should exercise discretion on who they admit and who they exclude if they 
are to maintain those welfare standards.6 As far as the cultural worry is concerned, it 
is argued, we should be mindful of the fact that immigrants will make a significant 
impact on their hosts’ national culture by bringing new social conventions, new 
languages, new religions, and new ways of using public spaces and which will often 
present a conflict with existing ways of life and pose challenges that require to be 
addressed.7  
 
Let us start with the first question: the distributive worry. It seems to be particularly 
pressing when we turn to what average people think when assessing the impact of 
migration on host societies. David Miller’s influential contribution on the topic begins 
by citing British opinion polls that show how 85% of the British public believes that 
immigration is putting pressure on public services such as schools, hospitals and 
housing and 65% believes that immigration has been bad for British society as a 
whole.8 To be sure, Miller does not endorse these data himself, at least not at this 
point; he uses them as a platform to launch a moral enquiry on the fair terms of 
interaction between immigrants and natives given a range of plausible commitments 
of the liberal national state (including a commitment to self-determination and to 
guaranteeing human rights and a decent standard of living to whoever resides in its 
territory). More cautiously, Joseph Carens also claims that “in our highly inegalitarian 
world there is some evidence that welfare state differences play some role in 
motivating patterns of immigration” but concludes that the choice between the welfare 
state and open borders is in itself a morally objectionable one, similar to the perverse 
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offer of “your money or your life”.9 
However, what both critics and defenders of freedom of movement fail to emphasise 
is the class-specific dimension of these concerns. The burdens of admission and 
integration are not shouldered equally by all immigrants and by all natives. As far as 
immigrants are concerned, and to take just one example, under the Tier One 
(Investor’s Visa Programme), those with the ability to invest one million pounds in the 
United Kingdom can apply for permanent leave to remain after only two years of 
residence and for permanent citizenship after only three years10 (significantly less than 
those who have reason to naturalise because of their family ties). Likewise, the 
inconveniences of assembling paperwork, waiting times, uncertainty of decision 
making and all the familiar troubles associated to immigration bureaucracy are 
unevenly spread among the immigrant population. Here again, to limit to just one 
example, if you are super-rich, under the super premium service for processing leaves 
to remain, for a ‘modest’ fee of around nine thousand pounds (as opposed to the just 
over eight hundred for the normal fee) application forms and biometric information are 
collected by a courier and visa officials to your home. There is no need to book an 
appointment and queue and the whole file is processed within twenty-four hours (as 
opposed to the over six months required for the normal service).  
These practices are generalizable across the European Union and beyond. In the 
aftermath of the Eurocrisis, Cyprus offered citizenship to foreign investors as 
compensation for the loss of their savings deposited in Cypriot banks. In 2012, 
Portugal offered a “golden residence permit” with fast-tracked access to citizenship 
and accelerated family reunification procedures to real estate and financial investors 
promising to create jobs in the country. In 2013, Malta approved a law that allowed 
wealthy applicants to obtain a European Union passport in return for € 650,000.11 
Even on issues of selection, immigrants are unequally burdened. Under the point-
based admission policy pioneered in Canada, and successfully spread around the 
world, including in Australia, Denmark, and the United Kingdom, prospective 
immigrants with higher skills, more money, a higher capacity to adapt in the host 
environment face significantly lower obstacles to admission and integration compared 
to their less wealthy, talented or well-trained counterparts. Indeed, in the case of highly 
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skilled immigrants, states find themselves competing for talent in a global race 
characterised by its own distinctive hierarchies whereby “the more desired the 
immigrant is, the faster she will be given an opportunity to lawfully enter the country 
and embark on a fast-tracked path to its membership rewards”.12 
Given the selective practices of admission characteristic of the migration regimes of 
most liberal democracies, it is easy to see that the distributive concerns voiced by 
critics of freedom of movement only affect those migrants who are members of 
particular social classes and not others. The same considerations on the relevance of 
social class apply also when we assess the issue from the point of natives and 
examine their grievances about immigrant competition with regard to public 
healthcare, housing or schools. Again here, not all immigrants will attract mistrust and 
resentment in equal measure - only those with lower skills and on middle to lower 
incomes who are likely to make use of these services (Arab or Russian billionaires 
living in London typically have their health checks in private clinics, send their children 
to expensive private schools and make no claims to, say, council housing).13 The kind 
of competition that leads to resentment is typically between poor working class natives 
and poor immigrants because these are the subjects more likely to need state-
subsidized assistance and access to a range of welfare services.  
This is where both the diagnosis of why immigration is perceived to be a threat, and 
the variety of suggested remedies go astray. Reducing the conflict between 
immigrants and natives to an identity conflict between all migrants and all natives 
obscures the class-related dimension of such conflicts and the fact that those who are 
responsible for the emergence of such conflicts are as much part of an existing political 
community as coming from the outside. But the problem with such an interpretation of 
political reality is that the focus on distributive conflicts between migrants and natives 
obfuscates their own internal distributive conflicts and concerns. It also runs the risk 
of condoning the dominant narrative fuelled by populist media and xenophobic political 
forces, at the expense of a more progressive interpretation of what is actually going 
on in contemporary liberal democracies. 
A rival interpretation of the empirical circumstances in which immigration injustices 
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arise would not begin with such an isolated analysis of the problem of justice in 
migration understood primarily as a conflict between agents who have different 
identities. It would rather examine the issue of migration in the context of wider social 
injustices appearing as a result of financial constraints on the funding of welfare states, 
the increase of sovereign debt, the impunity of domestic employers or property-owners 
who take advantage of the vulnerability of poor people (whether native or immigrants) 
and the fact that working class immigrants become scapegoats for the inability of 
liberal states to deliver the promise of equality in the distribution of social goods to all 
its members, in particular the most vulnerable ones. In short, it would be a discussion 
of how the crisis of the ideal of democratic solidarity to which many of our societies 
profess commitment is linked not to the consolidation of identity conflicts but to the 
pursuit of social and economic policies that leave poor working people with inadequate 
access to social goods like housing, healthcare, and a decent education for their 
children. Therefore, the real problem is not the perceived threat to jobs, schooling or 
access to health that migrants present for natives. And the most appropriate way 
forward is not to come up with admission and integration policies that will contain these 
effects by selecting migrants on the basis of particular, highly desirable, skill sets or 
potential for economic contribution and toughening up criteria for admission of all 
others.14 We ought to begin with a different diagnosis focusing on the obstacles that 
both poor migrants and poor white lower and middle-class natives encounter. Such 
threats are particularly pressing on the face of declining unions, the rise of populist 
political parties fuelling anti-immigration narratives, and in the absence of appropriate 
vehicles of political representation for immigrants and natives alike. On this rival 
analysis then, migration related distributive conflicts should be analysed as presenting 
not an injustice in their own right but as part of a larger account of social injustice, 
which focuses on a common source of oppression for both vulnerable native citizens 
and immigrants.15 And the solution will not come from responses that consolidate the 
divide between them. It is more likely to emerge from efforts to build political alliances 
across these two constituencies and from a firm commitment to strengthening 
networks of solidarity and institutions fostering joint bargaining.16 Taking up these 
challenges is the task of progressive political agents (movements, unions and parties) 
whose commitment to democratic representation and electoral success should not 
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sacrifice an appropriate interpretation of political reality. 
So far I have discussed distributive problems by taking for granted two factual claims 
that critics of freedom of movement typically make in analysing the conflict between 
migrants and native citizens. The first is that there is a genuine trade-off between 
immigration and the preservation of the welfare state. This premise can be, and has 
often been, contested. Immigrants, it is often said, are more a resource than a burden 
for liberal democracies: they make a positive fiscal contribution even in periods of 
budget deficit, they fill shortages in labour supply, they compensate for a decline in 
fertility rates, and they contribute to the development of human capital in host 
societies.17 The second factual assumption is that the unit of analysis for the 
distribution of shared benefits and burdens is the state. It might be objected that the 
discussion on shared burdens would be different if we were to take as the relevant 
unit of analysis not the state but a more expanding community of transnational interest 
or even a cosmopolitan society. Both these objections are plausible and receive 
contrasting answers. I did not mention them only because I am more interested in 
assessing the mainstream political interpretation of migration-related conflicts, the kind 
of claims that the likes of Nigel Farage or Donald Trump are inclined to make, as 
indicated in my opening paragraphs. Open borders cosmopolitanism is unlikely to 
move their supporters, the largest proportion of whom are working class citizens who 
have somehow managed to convince themselves that immigrants pose a threat to 
their security and their jobs. Even if we deploy these arguments, they are unlikely to 
gain much political traction without supplementing with the different narrative I have 
suggested. The alternative question I have raised is therefore still crucial to challenge 
the political terms under which migration related conflicts are explored in liberal 
democracies, and to reshape citizens’ ascriptions of responsibility and political 
expectations.  
 
3. Cultural concerns 
The second issue that is often raised in connection to the impact of immigration on 
host societies relates to conflicts of a cultural nature. The emphasis here goes on the 
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costs of integration and the fear that immigrants’ cultural diversity might undermine 
the bonds of trust and solidarity required for a functioning welfare state.18 Many 
authors have spoken about the fair settlement of these conflicts in terms of a quasi-
contract between natives and new members, a contract that requires both parties to 
take steps facilitating their mutual acceptance in the interest of the stable development 
of a shared political culture.19 In the case of immigrants, one such requirement has 
taken the form of making naturalisation conditional on the successful passing of 
linguistic, civic or other competence-based tests designed to prove the immigrants’ 
understanding and acceptance of important linguistic and social norms of their host 
society. David Miller, one of the most prominent advocates of these policies argues 
that ‘in order to function as a citizen, a person must also align herself with the political 
system of which she now forms a part’.20 His own account on the matter is quite 
demanding: not only is a sense of compliance with the basic authority and norms of 
the host state required, but immigrants ought to familiarize themselves with its cultural 
landmarks, ‘feasts and holidays, artistic and literary icons, places of natural beauty, 
historical artefacts, sporting achievements, popular entertainers, and so forth’. They 
ought to do this, he argues, even if their aim is ultimately to change the societal culture 
or to mix it with elements of their own heritage and background. Thus, as Miller 
explains, ‘a Muslim immigrant to Italy should expect that her female children will be 
allowed to dress modestly and to wear the headscarf to school but she should not 
object to the presence of a crucifix as a representation of Italy’s Catholic heritage’.21  
This argument raises two wider questions, both of which highlight the neglect of the 
issue of class in recent debates about immigration. Firstly, such expectations of 
cultural adaptation rest on a one-sided image of the political community, and a rather 
idealised one at that. They favour an overly positive narrative of the political community 
which conceals how much the construction of a political identity is a matter of ongoing 
political dispute, if it is to be more than a celebration of past achievements. To keep 
with the crucifix example, the problem with the argument about cultural integration is 
that the reification and sanitisation of political identity upon which it relies runs the risk 
of endorsing an exclusionary outlook which stifles rather than encouraging political 
activism. The issue of crucifix presences in Italian classrooms has been an object of 
vivid political contestation, with the main criticisms coming not from members of other 
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religions who object to it on cultural identity grounds but from secular Italian citizens 
who interpret it as a symbol of continuity with the country’s fascist tradition or as an 
attempt to undermine the separation of the Catholic church from the Italian state. The 
construction of common allegiances is often a matter of conflict not just between 
immigrants and natives but also among natives themselves. But the conflict is not 
cultural but of an ideological, often class-based, nature. To require that immigrants 
identify with the interpretation of the national culture that is at play in this case reifies 
consent around the conservative side of the political debate. It also discourages an 
alternative interpretation of the state as the political stage in which conflicts of ideology 
and social class are just as fundamental in shaping the development of political norms. 
Secondly, and even more perniciously, by asking immigrants to refrain from 
questioning such national traditions while recognising their demands to expect certain 
cultural concessions on ‘their’ way of life, what we effectively end up doing is relegating 
the potential objections of the immigrant to cultural objections. This in turn both 
weakens the interpretation of her criticism as political in character and reduces the 
effectiveness of her civic participation. The result is that an intervention that is 
supposed to facilitate cultural integration and encourage political activism achieves 
precisely the opposite effect, it entrenches cultural identification and removes major 
issues of political contestation from the spectre of political disagreement. Cultural 
integration of this stripe stifles the political activism it is supposed to encourage. When 
political conflict is reduced to identity conflict, other major sources of political 
disagreement are either silenced or go unnoticed. This has pernicious effects for both 
the appropriate diagnosis of such conflicts and the identification of remedies required 
to respond to them. 
One might argue here that the crucifix example is ill-chosen but that the general point 
would be valid if it were more charitably formulated. One might say that even if we 
agree that the construction of a particular political culture is a matter of ongoing 
dispute, and that we should not take any particular interpretation of it as the settled 
one, natives should remain in control of the process setting the terms of political 
debate. This is where civic competence tests become important. But again, here, we 
ought to ask which natives are in control, where exactly the bar for showing good 
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citizenship is set and by whom. If the degree of commitment required to participating 
in such civic debates is a minimal one, it is hard to see what exactly civic integration 
tests could measure and how they would show that they can measure what they 
purport to measure. If the standards of integration are demanding, it is hard to resist 
the objection that the entire project is an elitist one designed to conceal the class 
character of the state and to silence dissenting voices. Therefore, while demanding 
standards of adaptation neutralise political objections, minimalist ones end up shaking 
rather than consolidating the belief that the civic project to which migrants must commit 
is a worthy one. 
A final option might be to weaken the demand so much as to require of immigrants no 
more than the ability to operate in a particular language and to function as a citizen of 
the host community. But then it is not clear why we take it as a default position that 
the kind of knowledge required to exercise political judgment of this kind is one all 
natives have and all immigrants lack.22  Surely here too, the problem is that in the 
preparation for competent exercise of political judgment levels of education, degrees 
of culture, and different social skills matter hugely whether one is a native or an 
immigrant. If we ask a highly educated immigrant to take the test, she might perform 
much better than a poorly educated native. If that is the case, either we should ensure 
that all citizens and all natives are tested to guarantee they can be competent 
participants in public debates, or we should acknowledge, more plausibly, that 
different people will display different levels of interest in these matters regardless of 
how the relation to a particular political community is established in the first place.  
One final but important point is in order. The current, increasingly popular, practice of 
making citizenship conditional on the ability to demonstrate that migrants possess 
certain linguistic or civic skills is sometimes problematized in principle but seldom 
questioned as a matter of policy.23 Some authors see such policies as a necessary 
consequence of a state’s commitment to counter the influence of family structure on 
immigrants with certain cultural backgrounds and so as to facilitate their integration a 
new “stakeholders”.24 Thinking about the class discriminations that such an approach 
might entail helps us connect the principle to the practice and to criticise both. Civic 
competence tests are reminiscent of an age in which the same criteria were deployed 
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to restrict the franchise with regard to certain categories of people within a territory 
(e.g. those on lower incomes or with low levels of education and literacy). Then, as 
now, access to citizenship was a matter of class belonging. But while democrats 
around the world have successfully fought for the expansion of the franchise and 
against elitist citizenship, the danger to democratic inclusion now comes from the 
reification of national culture and the application of the same restrictions to resident 
immigrants. Then, as now, working class people, people with lower education, people 
who only spoke dialects and were barely literate in the standardised national language 
were excluded from the exercise of political rights (including the right to vote) on the 
same grounds that resident immigrants that fail to satisfy the criteria are now excluded. 
The interpretation of problems of integration along identity lines and at the expense of 
social class poses a serious threat to the ideal of democratic citizenship: it turns the 
latter from a vehicle of social emancipation to one of elite domination. If this sounds 
plausible, it is imperative that democrats in Western liberal societies, including 
mainstream social democratic parties and policymakers, stand up to this trend, that 
they seek to abolish these requirements rather than merely highlighting the gap 
between the ideal of citizenship and the content of current public policy. If both those 
who seek to shape migration policy and those who run electoral campaigns on its 
basis endorse the practice while professing sympathy with a different principle, the 
moral schizophrenia from which the centre left currently seems to suffer is likely to 
increase. Such an attitude merely legitimises the current race with right-wing 
movements and populist parties on who is ‘tougher’ when it comes to standards of 
naturalisation and obstacles to admission and integration, a race that progressive 
political movements are in any case unlikely to win.25 Without a renewed emphasis on 
unconditional citizenship for long-term residents26 as both a matter of principle and a 
matter of policy, inclusive democratic ideals  of integration will be sacrificed and 
eventually forgotten. There will be more Farages and more Trumps. And there might 
be even worse. 
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